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As the technosciences, including genomics, develop into a worldwide, global 
phenomenon, the question inevitably emerges whether and to what extent bioethics 
can and should become a globalised phenomenon as well. Could we somehow 
articulate a set of core principles or values that ought to be respected worldwide and 
that could serve as a universal guide or blueprint for bioethical regulations for 
embedding biotechnologies in various countries? This article considers one universal 
declaration, the UNESCO Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (2005), to 
which a special issue of Developing World Bioethics was dedicated.  General 
criticisms made there are that the concepts used in the Declaration are too general and 
vague to generate real commitment; that the so-called universal values are not 
universal; and, that UNESCO should not be engaged in producing such declarations 
which are the domain of professional bioethicists. This article considers these and 
other criticisms in detail and presents an example of an event in which the Declaration 
was used: the request by the Republic of Sakha, in Siberia, for a UNESCO delegation 
to advise on the initiation of a bioethics programme. The Declaration was intended to 
provide an adequate “framework of principles and procedures to guide states in the 
formulation of their legislation, policies and other instruments in the field of 
bioethics” (article 2a)  The Declaration was produced, and principles agreed upon, in 
an interactive and deliberative manner with world-wide ‘expert’ participation.  We 
argue that the key issue is not whether the general principles can be exported 
worldwide (in principle they can), but rather how processes of implementation and 
institutionalisation should take shape in different social and cultural contexts.  In 
particular broader publics are not routinely involved in bioethical debate and policy-






In an era of globalisation, the technosciences, including genomics, are quickly 
developing and evolving into a worldwide, global phenomenon. Therefore the 
question inevitably emerges whether and to what extent bioethics can and should 
become a globalised phenomenon as well. 1  Could we somehow articulate a set of 
core principles or values that ought to be respected worldwide and that could serve 
as a universal guide or blueprint for bioethical regulations for embedding 
biotechnologies in various countries? International organisations such as UNESCO, 
but also the Human Genome Organisation’s Ethics Committee (HUGO), could play 
an important role in this respect. The UNESCO declarations on genomics (notably 
“The Human Genome and Human Rights” Declaration and the “Declaration on 
Bioethics and Human Rights”) can be regarded as interesting examples of such an 
effort.  2 
As one of us has pointed out elsewhere, however, this role is far from 
uncontested. 3 In the editorial to a special issue of Developing World Bioethics, the 
UNESCO declaration has been fiercely criticized. 4.. One of the objections raised 
was that the concepts used in this document are too general and vague to generate 
real commitment. Moreover, it was argued that the “values claimed to be universal 
in this document are, in actual fact, nothing of the sort” 5, and this notably applies to 
concepts such as ‘human rights’ and ‘dignity’. A third important criticism raised by 
the authors of the editorial was that UNESCO is actually trespassing on other 
people’s domains. In their opinion, UNESCO is not supposed to set up such 
declarations at all. They argue that “whole articles deal with matters of informed 
consent in biomedical research and therapeutic practice. It is entirely unclear why 
UNESCO should concern itself with such a matter.” 6 Such activities, they write, are 
the domain of other organizations or, better still, should be left to the “professional 
bioethicists”. In short, UNESCO was denied the competence and qualification to 
discuss these things. 
A second example of an international platform engaged in this type of work is 
the Human Genome Organisation’s (HUGO) Ethics Committee, chaired by Ruth 
Chadwick 7. This committee has published an impressive series of statements on 
core issues concerning the ethical, legal and social aspects of genomics, including 
DNA Sampling (1998), Cloning (1999), Benefit Sharing (2000), Gene Therapy 
Research (2001), Human Genomic Databases (2002) and Stem Cell Research 
(2004). Its latest statement concerns pharmacogenomics (2007) 8. No doubt, the 
same kind of criticism that has been levelled at the UNESCO declaration could be 
directed towards these HUGO statements as well. 
Having been active ourselves in a series of efforts to promote a more 
international and trans-cultural approach in bioethical discourse, we believe that this 
is more than just an academic dispute. The quality and status of international 
bioethical declarations may come to play an important role in addressing the ethical 
dilemmas emerging in the context of international coordinated research efforts now 
and in the near future. Therefore, we want to take the dispute outlined above a step 
further by exploring the issue in two directions. First of all, we would like to assess 
what might be called the internal validity of the UNESCO declaration. To what 
extent can the criticisms that were made be regarded as fair and sound? Secondly, 
we want to assess the external validity of the declaration. This is done by reflecting, 
autobiographically as it were, on our professional experiences as ‘ELSA genomics 
experts’ involved in bioethical deliberations on an international level. The hard core 
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of these experiences is formed by a unique bioethical expedition we joined, 
organised under the auspices of UNESCO, which set out to assess the moral 
soundness and quality of a genetic screening programme that was carried out among 
indigenous people of North-East Siberia. What role can international bioethical 
declarations play in such a situation? In this way we move from the crucially 
important task of desk analysis of arguments and concepts to the complementary but 
equally important task of critical reflection on how ethics actually works in practice.  
 
The UNESCO declaration and its criticism reconsidered 
 
An important line of criticism directed against international bioethical declarations 
such as the one issued by UNESCO is that its core principles, such as solidarity, 
equity and beneficence, often remain relatively vague, while one may question the 
extent to which these principles can really be regarded as universal, from a bioethics 
perspective. A first important question is, whether this type of criticism is doing 
justice to the genre involved, to the type of document we are dealing with. Although 
the meanings of some of the key concepts used in this type of documents have been 
elaborated in intricate ways by academic bioethicists in their journals, they are likely 
to play a somewhat different role in the context of international policy development. 
Through international dialogue on various levels and in various contexts, and 
building on the conceptual efforts of professional bioethicists, declarations intend to 
contribute to the process of developing the basic framework of a universal bioethics. 
Its basic objective is to set up a network of concepts that may support the difficult 
but indispensable task of building international policies for science governance (and 
this includes genomics governance). At a time when genomics research is spreading 
globally at a high pace, this, one could argue, becomes an urgent task. Undoubtedly, 
academic bioethics has an important and critical contribution to make to this 
process, but this does not deny the relevance and value of international declarations 
as such. 
Since the UNESCO Declaration is criticised for conveying a Western 
ideological bias, it is relevant to consider the process by which the declaration was 
produced and the numbers of individuals and organisations involved.  The mandate 
for the declaration, from the General Conference of UNESCO in 2003,  “considers 
that it is opportune and desirable to set universal standards in the field of bioethics 
with due regard for human dignity and human rights and freedoms, in the spirit of 
cultural pluralism inherent in bioethics” 9.  There was a three-month pre-drafting 
consultation which involved a written consultation with member states and a 
meeting of the International Bioethics Committee (IBC) to decide on the 
declaration’s scope and structure.  After the drafting process (April 2004 to January 
2005) there was another consultation (January to September 2005) including 
national and regional meetings of experts.   The IBC has 36 members with a 
balanced geographical representation and cultural diversity. Some countries sent 
members with expertise in a particular area, for example, life sciences, social 
science, law, philosophy or education.  The IBC held a 3-day session with 200 
participants from 70 countries to discuss the declaration and included 
representatives from a variety of governmental and non-governmental organisations 
and National Bioethics Committees. 10  . 
The opening sentence of the mandate (above) tackles the obvious problem 
with a declaration intended to be acceptable to the 192 member states of UNESCO; 
how to gain agreement on any universal standards among diverse cultures. What is 
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the ‘spirit of cultural pluralism’?  In the preamble the point is made that culture 
should not be appealed to “at the expense of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms”. Taking the example of female circumcision, the United Nations 
condemns it as violating the rights of the child. There has been discussion of  
symbolic female circumcision to fulfil the cultural role of preparing girls for 
marriage, without the accompanying physical and psychological damage. There is 
an awareness of the dangers of simply condemning a practice without understanding 
its cultural role, but of course there may be ethical objections to continuing a 
symbolic practice, depending on what it is symbolising.  
In the special issue of Developing World Bioethics mentioned above, the 
editorial criticised the whole enterprise because the declaration contains principles 
that are considered as being not universal. In particular dignity is not regarded a 
universal principle.  The point made is that there is a European bias. Indeed, 
“European enlightenment philosophy pervades the declaration”. 11 Yet, in the first 
consultation stage of the declaration a questionnaire was sent out to member states 
asking which fundamental principles should be reaffirmed in the declaration. The 
values which all respondents agreed on were dignity, equality, non-discrimination 
and respect for privacy. Out of 67 responses there were eleven from Africa, 8 from 
Asia and the Pacific, 10 from Arab states, 6 from Latin America and the Caribbean, 
10 from Central and Eastern Europe and 21 from Europe and America.  Although an 
answer to a questionnaire is not strong evidence that fundamental principles are 
universally shared, it at least indicates that dignity as a concept is widely 
recognisable. There were specific references to dignity in written comments on the 
draft, by, for example, Indonesia and Paraguay.12. For the purposes of a Declaration 
intended to influence governments throughout the world, the recognition and 
acceptability of the fundamental principles by all countries is crucial.   
The evidence against the universality of dignity offered in the editorial is an 
article entitled “Dignity is a useless concept” by the US bioethicist Ruth Macklin.13. 
She argues that dignity means no more than respect for autonomy.   However, she 
notes that people refer to treating a dead body with dignity and argues that “This 
situation clearly has nothing to do with respect for autonomy since the object is no 
longer a person but a cadaver”.  An alternative view would be that since cadavers 
cannot have autonomy, perhaps dignity is not the same as autonomy and so may be 
used about people without autonomy, including the dying, the very elderly, and 
about ex-people. As Häyry and Takala point out, dignity is not defined in the 
declaration, nor is its relationship to other principles explained. 14.  This is true of 
other principles, that are “proclaimed” in the Declaration rather than discussed. As 
Benatar and Williams both point out in their respective contributions to the special 
edition, the Declaration is a compromise and the principles are indeed rather vague. 
15. This is, of course, a common criticism of principlism and of the four principles of 
medical ethics in particular. The principles are necessarily vague in an international 
declaration in order to secure agreement by all member states. The declaration is not 
legally binding and the principles “are to be respected”, “should be given due 
regard” rather than representing obligations. This does not deny that they could 
function as guidelines for reviewing or reorganising research practices, for instance 
when a country is devising a national system for ethical review of medical research 
for the first time.  Since all ethical principles are interpreted differently within and 
between social and cultural groups and over time, precise definitions, if acceptable, 
could be too specific to the circumstances when a Declaration is made and therefore 
not able to be adapted to an unforeseen development.  
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Landman and Schüklenk criticise particular articles as “untenable”. 
Referring to article 3.2 they argue: “Surely it is untenable to say individual”s interest 
should always have absolute priority over societal interest” 16 op cit, v).  They give 
the example of public health where it may be necessary to have a proportionate 
restriction on individuals for the social good and so “nobody in the real world would 
take article 3b seriously as it stands.” 17 . However article 3.2 actually reads “the 
interests and welfare of the individual should have priority over the sole interest of 
science or society” (authors’ emphasis), but in their comments, the crucial term 
“sole” is left out. Subsequently, Landman and Schüklenk  state that article 4, if 
adopted, “would render pretty much all biomedical research impossible.”18 The 
article reads, “Benefits to participants must be maximised and their possible harms 
minimised”. The editors argue that maximising individual benefit cannot be a 
primary objective. The primary objective of medical research would be to test a drug 
or a treatment. Although this is obviously right, we do not see why in doing so, 
benefits should not be maximised and harms should not be minimised. Otherwise, 
how would you obtain fully informed consent for the trials?  The claim that “most 
researchers and research ethics committees would disregard” the clause would, if 
true, make it difficult to find healthy volunteers for research, which is apparently 
refuted by actual practice.  
The authors also disagree with Article 11 as there can be no discrimination 
against individuals and groups “on any grounds”, whereas there may be good 
grounds to discriminate against, say people with racist views.  However, the clause 
does not say “on any grounds.” 19. It says “in violation of human dignity, human 
rights and fundamental freedoms”. The example given, of a racist applying to be an 
equal opportunity officer, would be covered by this clause. 
The crux of  Landman’s and Schüklenk’s  dislike of the UNESCO 
declaration, however, is that an official organisation is moving into bioethics and 
“Bioethics, as we understand it, is an academic discipline and not a playground for 
government appointed politician-experts to muse on in an inconsequential and 
arguable not very sophisticated manner about ethics.” 20. Ironically, this line of 
reasoning is not unlike the type of criticism professional bioethicists themselves 
often receive when they start ‘meddling’ (as members of research ethics committees 
for instance) with affairs that, according to some, could better be left to the 
professionals (in this case, biomedical researchers). Yet, we would argue that 
bioethics is not only an academic discipline. In fact, bioethicists often want to use 
their academic credentials to influence policy and practice, for example Schuklenk 
in his work in the area of HIV and AIDS. 
Academic bioethicists are not the target audience for this declaration, 
governments are. Henk ten Have, Director of the Division of Ethics of Science and 
Technology responsible for the Declaration, is quoted as saying that the Declaration 
does not aim to “promote academic bioethics”. UNESCO aims to use its guidance in 
order to “educate healthcare professionals and young scientists in ethics, to establish 
ethics committees, and create an infrastructure for bioethics” 21. The declaration 
seeks to encourage ethical review of scientific and medical research, consent 
procedures for research involving human beings, public engagement and debate 
around bioethical issues. Although it may be doubtful whether any group of 
bioethicists would agree on what constitutes a sophisticated argument, the intention 
of the UNESCO document was to act as a basis for member states to create their 
own framework for ethical review and public involvement.  For this purpose the 
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publishing of pamphlets, disparaged by Landman and Schuklenk, is more 
appropriate than academic journal articles. 
 A final criticism considered here, made by Benatar, is that it is a weakness that 
the Declaration concentrates on human beings. As Benatar himself points out, 
however, this is following the wishes of member countries when the first consultation 
was carried out. 22. Critics could argue that humans are given privileged status, and 
they are, but the declaration as it stands does not preclude the elaboration of similar 
documents addressing issues of animal ethics or environmental ethics. The ideological 
framework is clearly stated to be human rights and in a declaration addressed to States 
the focus is on the protection of the individual, over the sole interest of science and 
society.  This would be problematic in an international declaration if human rights 
could be shown to have a Western or European bias. However, while human rights 
may not be a framework commonly used by ‘professional bioethicists”.23, it is 
frequently used by international conventions and declarations and many non-western 
countries subscribe to human rights legislation. In the special issue from which this 
criticism is taken, Nie Jing Bao argues that a human rights perspective is not at all 
incompatible with Confucianism or Taoism.24  As we said, the declaration is 
addressed to a broader audience than “professional bioethicists” and is intended to be 
“comprehensible and accessible to everyone….addressed to both Member States and 
to researchers, scientists, decision-makers and citizens. 25  
 
Lack of attention to social/cultural context 
 
It is a very common criticism of bioethics in general that it pays insufficient attention 
to social and cultural contexts. Is it ethically legitimate to argue that certain policies 
‘ought’ to be implemented in places where a bioethical infrastructure has been 
inexistent? Bioethicists might argue in journal articles that people ought to be able to 
sell their organs or that sex selection ought to be allowed, but if such arguments are to 
effect policy, should they take into account the political and cultural situation in any 
particular society? Could we argue in favour of commercialisation on theoretical 
grounds without ensuring that those who are selling organs are also able to afford the 
necessary immune suppressant drugs? Can we argue against sex selection in a culture 
where giving birth to sons or daughters affects people’s prospects in terms of poverty 
or prosperity? Or can we argue in favour of sex selection (on the basis of 
‘reproductive autonomy’ for example) even when this would result in a skewed sex 
ratio, with long term social consequences? The declaration is only setting a 
framework within which different societies and cultures can operate, provided they 
advance anti-discrimination and benefit sharing. There will not be the same 
arrangements everywhere. Still, it is stated in the Declaration that the socio-cultural 
context cannot be appealed to in order to legitimise marginalization or exclusion.  The 
importance of public health and environmental provisions is also recognised (article 
14). 
Rawlinson and Donchin 26 argue that the declaration does not recognise 
disparities of power and wealth. Yet, although it does not specify particular 
inequalities, it does mention vulnerable groups and women and children, who have 
unequal access to resources in many countries. The point of the universal declaration 
is to assert that while in any particular society there will be structural inequalities, 
everyone has human rights and in all societies “progress in science and technology 
should advance the improvement of living conditions and the elimination of 
marginalisation and exclusion of persons on any grounds” (article 4). Landman and 
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Schuklenk are concerned that characterising groups/people as vulnerable could be 
harmful to others considered less vulnerable.  However, who the vulnerable groups 
are is an empirical question in any society and could change over time.  It is of course 
a common complaint of a dominant group that they are discriminated against when 
there are special measures for a less powerful group.  Whether or not the complaint is 
upheld should be a matter of examining the evidence.  
Yet, this type of discussion is bound to remain theoretical and academic as 
long as it takes place on this rather abstract and general level. In order to further 
develop the discussion, we would need to study specific examples of how such 
declarations function in specific contexts. By doing so the ‘external’ validity of 
international declarations can be tested empirically as it were. We ourselves have 
been involved in, and have been greatly intrigued by, the following example of an 
effort to ‘export’ bioethical principles beyond their usual sphere of influence. And we 
would like to further develop this debate by drawing on our own experiences. 
 
UNESCO delegation to Siberia 
 
In May 2005 we were invited (as ELSA genomics experts) to join a UNESCO 
delegation for a site visit to Yakutsk, Capital of Sakha (also known as Yakutia), 
Siberia, where a genetic screening programme for myotonic dystrophy was being set 
up, - a hereditary muscular disease that is prevalent among indigenous people in 
Northern Siberia. This screening programme was also of interest in the context of the 
famous Human Genome Diversity Program, headed by Luca Luigi Cavalli Sforza 27 
and devoted to studying early human history and migration on the basis of genomic 
data derived from populations living today, thereby updating information that was 
previously provided by linguistics, ethnography, anthropology, palaeontology and 
archaeology. The research is notably based on genes coding for blood types (A, B, O 
and Rh) as well as on mitochondrial DNA (‘Eve’) and the Y chromosome (‘Adam’). 
Eastern Siberia (notably its indigenous population) is of some interest in this respect 
because it must have constituted part of the bridge that allowed Asian populations to 
migrate (in three separate waves) into America. The HGDP regards genomes of living 
individuals (notably of indigenous populations) as deposits of DNA, as 
bioarchaeological files so to speak, so that DNA analysis may provide genetic 
snapshots of human diversity and history before some of these ‘endangered 
populations’ disappear for good. Yakutia is a sparsely populated area in the 
permafrost regions of Siberia, whose inhabitants are mainly dependent upon fishing. 
Diamond mining (recently privatised) is its sole core industry. 
Our job, invited as ELSA experts in the domain of genomics, was to assist in 
the process of assessing benefits and risks of genetic screening in Yakutia. Basically, 
we attended a conference devoted to “Problems of the gene pool preservation of 
indigenous people of the North”. The workshop’s main objective was to establish an 
ethics committee as well as a bioethics training module for monitoring the screening 
programme. 
On the first day of the conference, some of the ongoing research and screening 
projects (including lectures on the diversity of mitochondrial DNA and Y 
chromosome lineages in populations in Yakutia) were presented while on the second 
day the focus shifted towards the ethical domain. The workshop was organised by the 
local UNESCO unit in collaboration with UNESCO Paris. UNESCO’s involvement 
was motivated by its objective of “enshrining” universal declarations, such as the one 
on Bioethics and Human Rights, in which it is recognized that scientific programmes 
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may particularly affect vulnerable indigenous and local communities. In UNESCO 
declarations it is stated that screening activities should be conducted on the basis of 
prior, free and informed consent, while benefits resulting from scientific research 
should be shared with society (for instance in the form of diagnostic facilities or 
support for health services). At the end of the workshop a declaration was accepted 
stating that an ethics committee was to be established consisting of members from 
various backgrounds and that the work of the committee should be supported by an 
on-site training programme. 
Although this visit constituted a unique experience, it also raised a number of 
questions. First of all, the language used by local politicians and physicians during the 
discussions was at times uncannily reminiscent of what we in the West would refer to 
as eugenics. One politician for instance proudly announced that the screening 
programme for myotonic dystrophy would ‘cleanse the gene pool”, thus improving 
the health conditions of a population that had to survive under harsh climatologic 
circumstances. This raised questions on our part concerning issues such as individual 
and free informed consent. On the other hand, who were we to question the validity 
and quality of their procedures? Could ‘our’ bioethical views and principles simply be 
exported? In the middle of Yakutsk, a rather desolate and isolated town mainly 
consisting of quickly deteriorating concrete buildings, an impressive hospital had 
been built, funded by the diamond industry, whose very architecture seemed rather 
intimidating, although it could also be interpreted as benefit sharing in the sense of 
providing people who participated in the screening programme with health facilities. 
We also noticed that it was difficult to really enter into a discussion of a 
deliberative, ‘Western’ type, asking and responding to critical questions. Besides the 
language problem (only a limited number of the people we met spoke either English, 
German or French so that in most cases we had to rely on the services of an 
interpreter, trained and recruited by the diamond company), we noticed a cultural 
divide as well: posing critical questions seemed somewhat at odds with local 
conventions and was apparently considered impolite. Rather, deliberations assumed 
narrative forms, exchanging anecdotal information over diner, invariably consisting of 
raw fish, horse tripe and vodka. Finally, last but not least, we felt uneasy about our 
own role, about the possibility that our very presence would serve a symbolic 
function, that it could be interpreted as legitimisation the project, - an international 
expert committee reviewed the programme, therefore its ethical permissibility seemed 
safeguarded. This was underlined by the fact that contrary to what was emphatically 
promised, there has never been a follow-up. 
Interestingly, the kinds of questions we ourselves had with regard to our visit 
were not the questions addressed by the critics of UNESCO declarations cited above. 
In our view, the issue was not whether or not informed consent or human dignity can 
be meaningful and valid ethical principles at all, - they obviously can. Our worries 
and concerns could easily be articulated in these terms, notwithstanding the intricate 
bioethical discussions concerning the precise meaning of these terms that take place in 
analytically oriented bioethics journals. Our basic concerns rather had to do with 
power issues and procedural issues than with conceptual ones, with the power plays 
we had somehow entered, the meaning and impact, not of the terms we used, but 
rather of our very presence. In bioethical discussions the focus often tends to be on the 
content and meaning of basic concepts, their conceptual validity. What tends to be 
neglected, but what we found much more relevant and important, are issues of 
implementation and institutionalisation. The question is not ‘what is’ dignity (for 
instance), but rather: how can principles such as dignity or informed consent become 
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an integral part of research and screening practices, - and who should play a role in 
this implementation process (scientists, policy makers, ethicists, or rather the public at 
large?), notably in areas such as Yakutia where there is no such thing as a functioning 
bioethical infrastructure. How are ethical deliberations to be organised? For instance: 
the question is not whether our lectures on informed consent were conceptually 
adequate (we believe they were). Rather, the question was how did they function, 
what impact did they have, and, finally, how to involve the broader public in 
designing screening policies? While the workshop was attended by researchers, 
physicians, policy makers and bioethics experts, Sakha citizens as such were absent. 
As was stated above, one of the strengths of the UNESCO declaration is that it 
is the outcome of a process of intricate deliberations. It was not written at the desk of 
a bioethics expert, but rather in an interactive manner. Its weakness no doubt is that 
besides ethicists only government representatives and NGOs were allowed to 
contribute to this process. In many European countries consultative processes to 
access lay knowledge and expertise are well established and routinely undertaken by 
governmental bodies and NGOs as well as under the European Union Framework 
programmes (e.g. European Commission, 2005; Nuffield Council on Bioethics; 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority HFEA 28.). In 2003 for instance, the 
HFEA (UK regulatory body) decided against allowing sex selection for non-medical 
reasons and admitted to having been influenced in their conclusions by the views 
collected in a representative poll as well as by responses to their public consultation.29  
Interestingly, the HFEA was criticised by bioethicist John Harris 30 for, among other 
things, accepting public hostility to sex selection “at face value”. No doubt, the 
procedure adopted by the HFEA is still some way from a genuinely bottom up 
approach, since the public were asked to react to issues pre-framed by the HFEA. 31. 
Nonetheless, the willingness to consider more interactive methods for designing 
regulations and declarations seems wide-spread. Could it be that in the future the 
production of statements will involve broader publics. Could ‘bottom-up’ 
methodologies be extended or extrapolated from the national to the international level 
in order to achieve these goals?  
Reflecting on our experiences we may conclude that the Yakutia experience 
demonstrated for us in a rather vivid manner both the strengths and the weaknesses of 
international bioethical declarations. The Declaration could have been an appropriate 
tool for the regulation of biotechnologies in the sense that it provided a framework 
within which a country like Yakutia could devise specific arrangements. Thus, it 
constituted a starting point for a first assessment, a first exploration of unknown 
territory. The weakness was, however, that we did not come much further than that, 
and that a declaration, instead of giving impetus to a thorough reflection on emerging 
quandaries, may also be used as an instance of ‘ethics theatre’, setting the stage for an 
encounter that merely served ritualistic purposes. For indeed, in practice what was 
produced was yet another formal declaration rather than specific arrangements to 
embody the articles of the Declaration on informed consent, the right to refuse to take 
part in research, opportunities for pluralistic public debate and so on.  
 
From bioethics to public involvement? 
 
At this point we would like to introduce a second example, once again borrowing 
from personal experience. On November 2007 a delegation of bioethics experts from 
China visited the Netherlands. The highlight was a Chinese-Dutch symposium on the 
societal aspects of genomics in Utrecht, November 5. Contributions from the 
10 
 
Netherlands tended to focus on cultural and ethical differences between West and 
East. In a recent report, for instance, Van den Belt and Keulartz 32 had noticed that, in 
discussions on bioethics in East Asia, including China, the ‘Wild East’ argument 
figures quite prominently, i.e. the claim that, because bioethical regulations in the East 
are supposed to be less severe than in the West, combined with a much more 
technology-friendly cultural climate, Asian researchers are less hindered by bioethical 
bureaucracies as well as by moral scruples and fears about the possible consequences 
of new technologies for society or the environment. Moreover, whereas the West is 
dominated by the language of autonomy, individual rights and informed consent, in 
countries like China ‘Asian’ values are supposedly more important, and this includes 
Confusian values such as ‘familialism’.  The People’s Republic of China occupies a 
remarkable position in the debate on Asian values, not only because of the  impressive 
number of inhabitants of this gigantic country, but also because, on closer 
examination, the Asian values such as familialism are often specified as Confucian 
values. 33. These differences between the West and the Far East seem to undermine 
the prospects for a universal bioethics as a complementary efforts that should 
accompany bioscientific and genomics developments worldwide. 
From the side of the Chinese delegation, however, this picture was challenged. 
They argued that, although it is true that in China professional bioethics is still a 
relatively small-scale phenomenon, this does not mean that in their country ‘anything 
goes’. Moreover, rather than cultivating ‘Asian’ values, these Chinese bioethicists are 
basically involved in elaborating an ethic that is quite in line with the international 
lingua franca, the ethics of autonomy, individual rights and informed consent. Indeed, 
the Chinese delegation claimed that phrases like Asian values are hardly ever 
mentioned in Asian debates.  Renzong-Qui, who has long been an influential figure in 
Chinese bioethics, has argued for ‘moderate ethical universalism and moderate ethical 
relativism’ and that he ‘personally... favour[s] the rights approach, because in a 
developing country like China, there has been a longstanding tradition in ethics that 
the dominant talks are duty-oriented but without rights’.34. The Bangkok declaration 
(1993) signed by representatives of 30 Asian governments  stressed the “universality, 
objectivity and non-selectivity of all human rights and the need to avoid the 
application of double standards in the implementation of human rights and its 
politicisation”.35  Adorno acknowledges the European origins of the human dignity 
and human rights framework and the sometimes ‘excessive emphasis’ on individual 
rights in the west as opposed to family and community values. However, he argues 
that the opposition of western and non-western values, and of universal human rights 
and cultural diversity, ‘have lost much of their practical significance’.  Non-western 
countries increasingly sign up to, and take part in the formulation of human rights 
treaties and there is sufficient flexibility in these agreements to be compatible with 
cultural diversity. 36  
Discussions such as this one are important against the backdrop of the way in 
which bioscience, notably genomics, is evolving. It is becoming a world-wide, global 
phenomenon as we said, and insofar as biotechnology and genomics are globalising, 
this also seems to call for an international or even global bioethics. The key question 
than is the extent to which the bioethical model as it has emerged under specific 
cultural and societal conditions in the West, can be extrapolated to others cultural 
realms. Can bioethics be regarded an ‘export product’?  
Ironically, while this discussion is evolving, the traditional bioethics model as 
it had emerged in the 1980s in Western countries such as the Netherlands and the UK 
is now increasingly under pressure in these countries themselves. Traditional 
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bioethics not only involved ethical principles such as autonomy and informed consent, 
but also the institutionalisation and professionalisation of bioethics as a practice, in 
the form of bioethics experts, bioethics committees, bioethics journals, bioethics 
courses and bioethics research institutes. In the 1990s, however, the ethical expert-
model became challenged. The interest began to shift from formulating and applying 
ethical ‘principles’ towards developing methodologies for involving publics and 
societal stakeholders in bioethical debates. The ethical expert-model increasingly had 
to compete with more interactive strategies for science policy, based on various forms 
public engagement. One of the problems of the ethical expert model was that it 
seemed difficult to explain who the ethicists represented and on what body of 
knowledge their expertise was based.  
To the extent that traditional bioethics is being replaced, or at least 
complemented, with a variety of interactive methodologies and consultations, the 
same question that was formulated above re-emerges. Can a more interactive 
approach to the various bioethical issues as it has developed in genomics and the 
biosciences be ‘exported’? Can some of these evolving methodologies become a 
model for bioethical debate elsewhere? Apparently, these methodologies seem even 
harder to transfer that the key concepts of bioethics as such. Besides differences in 
terms of political systems (such as the one-party system versus a multiple party 
system) and communicative culture (some cultures may be regarded as “narrative” 
rather than “deliberative” for example), the most obvious problem is no doubt the 
problem of size. Compared to the Netherlands, China is an incredibly huge country, a 
whole world. What would public engagement or public participation mean under such 
conditions?   
 
Concluding remarks on formulating bioethics policies  
 
The UNESCO declaration aims to provide an adequate ‘framework of principles and 
procedures to guide states in the formulation of their legislation, policies and other 
instruments in the field of bioethics’ (article 2a).  Such a document is produced 
following a process of worldwide consultation with representatives of member states 
and experts and necessarily includes some compromise and vagueness in order to 
achieve consensus.  Its value can only be judged by its influence. For states that do 
not have a structure of ethical review of research or public consultation on bioethical 
issues, the declaration could be used as a starting point to develop such structures. 
 At the same time, it is clear that putting together declarations is only one way 
to contribute to the effort of producing a global bioethics, on the basis of dialogue. Its 
basic objective is to stimulate rather than to conclude or forgo bioethical 
deliberations. Moreover, methodologies for public engagement will no doubt become 
increasingly important on the international level as well. The question than becomes 
whether they may profit from such declarations (and vice versa) and how broader 
publics can become involved in declaration development. 
 Finally, it is clear that these types of discussion will remain rather academic as 
long as they take place on a rather abstract and general level. What is needed is 
empirical on-site research in the functioning of declarations, notably in countries 
where biotechnologies developments are relatively new and the institutionalisation of 
bioethics still finds itself in a relatively early stage of development. How will 
activities to promote and ‘export’ declaration work in practice, notably under 
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